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European Cosmopolitan Solidarity: Questions of Citizenship, Difference and Post-
Materialism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an interesting paradox evident in the current debates about the future prospects of European 
citizenship. On the one hand, there is the sense of Europe’s historic mission to protect the values of 
democracy, pluralism and participation and develop new institutional structures that are adequate 
for an age that is increasingly defined by globalisation. The subsequent need to develop a European 
public sphere and civil society to match the changes in the way in which we do politics has been 
commented on by a number of critics. Yet, on the other hand, there is also the fear that these values 
at more grass roots levels are in terminal decline. Many are increasingly concerned that in societies 
dominated by consumerism and mediated politics that simply developing new tiers of government is 
unlikely to arrest the erosion of citizenship. This paradox is sharpened by the fact that the ‘war on 
terrorism’ is constantly reminding us of the need to defend the values of democracy against 
fundamentalists who hold them in contempt. The question we are being asked to resolve is how we 
might redefine a European public sphere in more global times and yet strengthen the connection of 
citizens to more normative political values. These issues have become central to the struggle for a 
cosmopolitan Europe. For many it has been European social democracy’s ability to defend social 
standards of welfare and communal life that is at the forefront of the struggle against neoliberalism. 
For example, Jeremy Rifkin (2004) has argued in this respect that the future is European rather than 
American. On a number of quality of life questions such as health, education and the environment 
the countries of the European Union exceed their American counterparts. If the challenge of the 
future is the ability to construct safe, healthy and sustainable environments then it is Europe rather 
than America that is currently leading the way. 
 Despite the continuation and reinvention of social democracy there have been a number of 
voices recently that have argued that European social achievements are currently under threat. The 
decline of the manual working-class, trade unions and old style social democracy has meant that the 
welfare state has become progressively identified with the poor rather than the universal rights of 
citizenship. In the United States as well as Europe, politics has become progressively dominated by 
the concerns of capital rather than labour. However given the historic weakness of the labour 
movement in the American context it has been European societies that have been most overly 
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transformed in a post-democratic direction. Indeed it currently questionable as to whether the 
decline of the social democratic Left can be reversed. The collapse of the labour movement within 
Europe calls into question the possibility of a better society based upon collectivist principles. If the 
history of twentieth century Europe was defined by a struggle between capitalism and socialism then 
such oppositions are unlikely to mark to the twenty-first century. The rapid disintegration of the Left 
has lead to a rapid increase in inequality and the dominance of neoliberal forms of globalisation 
(Jacques 2004). But if the old style socialist Left are in decline, many of their concerns in respect of 
seeking alternatives beyond a world dominated by capitalism remain as central as ever. Here we 
need to remind ourselves that old style national social democracy has been placed under increasing 
threat by globalising pressures and that there is no return to the ‘good old days’ of the 1950s and 
1960s. This does not of course mean that the state - as many have claimed - is impotent; but it does 
mean that the state is continually being de-centered by the global flows of money, culture and 
politics. In certain respects, a cosmopolitan argument pushes the view that our political and cultural 
sensibilities lag behind the dramatic shift that has taken place in the economy. The arrival of the 
virtual economy, twenty-four hour money markets and capital’s enhanced ability to exit local 
financial markets has diminished the power of states in relation to the movements of capital. For 
example, the ratio of foreign-exchange turnover of world trade climbed from 10:1 in the early 1980s 
to 60:1 by the late 1990s (Goldblatt, Held, McGrew and Perraton 1997). These features suggest the 
need to create a new politics beyond the nation. The argument here is that questions of politics and 
citizenship need to find more post-national forms of expression. Despite some commentators 
arguing for the construction of a global polity this seems unrealistically utopian in a world that is 
still quaking in the wake of September 11
th
. Here we might want to retain a double vision of the 
United States as both a democratic republic and both barbaric and violent operating in a zone of 
global conflict (Buck-Morss 2003). However the more the United States seeks to impose ‘freedom’ 
the closer it comes to recreating totalitarianism. We would do well to remember that the moral 
grammar of European totalitarianism depended upon clear distinctions between a virtuous in-group 
and an out-group who had to be destroyed (Todorov 2003). In this respect, the creation of a 
European space built upon law and social solidarity has an added global significance (Leonard 
2005). It is then the development of post-national forms of citizenship at the European level that I 
wish to explore. However I am aware that Europe needs to become a project that goes beyond the 
defence of liberal freedoms. As Ulrich Beck (2000: 158) argues ‘only in the transnational space of 
Europe can the politics of individual countries change from a threatened object to a shape-giving 
subject of globalization’. In this article however I want to stress that we need to be careful to ensure 
that such a project avoids the racialised language of civilisational difference (Huntington 1997). It 
has become a much remarked upon feature of contemporary European politics that the need to 
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defend ‘our’ welfare state often becomes entangled in racialised languages of hostility in respect of 
immigrants and asylum seekers. The post-September 11
th
 world has seen the enhanced fostering of 
right-wing political parties that have traded upon the codes of nationalism and patriotism in order to 
promote a Europe of racial purity and exclusivity (Gilroy 2004). Here I seek to explore the 
possibility of new European cultures of solidarity that might be built through the recognition of 
difference rather than its denial.   
 
European Cosmopolitan Solidarity: An Identity Under Construction? 
 
Before continuing with this argument we need to explore whether a European cosmopolitanism can 
offer an alternative radical politics to that of neoliberalism? The cosmopolitan argument in response 
to the pressures of global markets is global responsibility. Only through the renegotiation of our 
global interdependencies can we hope to institute a world based upon social justice, democracy and 
respect for the ‘Other’. This suggests a different politics from what Zygmunt Bauman (2004:137) 
has called ‘local entrenchment’. In other words, the turn to local identities simply exits the stage to 
allow for the dominance of global forces. A cosmopolitan view rejects attempts to find purely local 
solutions to global problems and requires the reinvention of civic solidarity beyond the nation-state. 
For many, it is the survival of the European ‘social state’ that protected the citizen against the 
uncertainty of the market that is at issue. 
 Pierre Bourdieu (2001, 2003) has called for a European social movement to defend civilised 
values (the rights to an education, health, culture and work) against the power of the market. As a 
result dominant politics of the nation-state across Europe, being the social state has withered away, 
to be gradually replaced by the market and the consumer. Neoliberal politics has contributed to both 
massive social inequalities and to the demoralisation and cynicism on the part of ordinary citizens. 
More specifically Bourdieu (2003:29) argues that neoliberalism has introduced: 
‘A mode of production that entails a mode of domination based on the institution of insecurity, 
domination through precariousness: a deregulated financial market fosters a deregulated labour 
market and thereby the casualisation of labour that cows workers into submission’.  
In this respect, modern capitalism has progressively undermined the practice of democratic 
citizenship. In our economic lives the market has instituted a dual labour market of overworked and 
stressed professionals and low status and unskilled jobs with few career prospects. While they are 
both subject to neoliberal pressures of downsizing, increasing insecurity and market uncertainty, this 
division institutes a cultural divide between global citizens who are international, polygot and 
polycultural and the locals who are more likely to take refuge in nationalism and parochialism.  
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The aim of a European social movement would be to ‘restore politics’ (Bourdieu 2003:38). 
Such a social movement would need to build upon many of the concrete objectives of a multitude of 
social movements in areas such as housing, employment, health and the environment. For Bourdieu, 
central to these movements are a shared sense of civic activism and a rejection of the regressive 
politics of neoliberalism. In this respect, most of the campaigns are organised internationally linking 
together different social and cultural struggles. Many of these social movements, unlike mainstream 
political parties, do not depend upon having definite leaders and have emerged out of a libertarian 
tradition. The reason that Europe becomes central to these arguments is two fold. Firstly the 
existence of a European polity at a trans-national level converts cosmopolitanism into a possibility. 
The explicit focus of a European social movement would be to argue that Europe must be more than 
a central bank, bureaucracy and single currency. The democratic aim would be to replace the 
European Commission with a genuine executive responsible to an elected parliament. Secondly the 
dominance of European trade amongst fellow Europeans helps destroy some of the myths of the 
global economy. Bourdieu (2001:36) reports that ‘70 per cent of the trade with European countries 
are with other European countries’.  This is both a threat as well as an opportunity. Here the concern 
is over nations who attempt to gain a competitive advantage by driving down social welfare and 
wage costs. Alternatively a European social movement should aim to work towards the creation of a 
European social state. This would seek to enhance rather than downgrade the accomplishments of 
nation-states in areas such as education, welfare and health. Such a utopian demand could only be 
possible in a social movement that was capable of standing up to the regressive forces of 
nationalism and financial markets. Notably while this movement would have to be created out of a 
variety of social movements, Bourdieu (2003: 57) argues that it is ‘trade unionism, which could be 
the engine of a social Europe’. Despite the declining role of trade unions and the general defeat of 
the labour movement, Bourdieu argues for their mutual revitalisation. For example, one of the many 
positive roles a revived trade unionism could play would be the unionisation of immigrants in the 
unofficial economy. This would provide them with new hope and purpose in a Europe that grants 
immigrant workers few rights and little social protection.  
Bourdieu’s argument is that meaningful citizenship, stable employment and welfare all 
depend upon the invention of a European civil society. However I remain unconvinced that such a 
politics could reconnect the tripod of the engaged citizen, full-time work and the welfare state. Here 
my argument is that Bourdieu is correct that a European social movement is required to civilise the 
policies of the market, but I do not think it is possible to return to a politics of full employment and 
a strong labour movement, however desirable this might seem. The challenge now is how 
democratic participation becomes possible ‘after full employment’. Here a post-national Europe 
requires not so much the right to work as a form of politics where ‘work’ loses its centrality. In the 
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European context, claims to citizenship are underwritten less by a reformulated ‘workerism’ than a 
new politics of solidarity and difference. This said, Bourdieu is correct to point to the connection 
between economic uncertainties and the decline or erosion of citizenship more generally. Etienne 
Balibar (2002) has similarly argued for a European citizenship that includes all the communities that 
are historically present on European territory. In particular he seeks to connect the expansion of the 
market and uncertainty into the cultures of everyday life and the intensification of populist racism. 
There is then no European country that can claim to have been immune to popular ideas that have 
consistently linked the arrival of ‘foreigners’ and increased competition over jobs and the decline of 
shared living standards. However in ultra-nationalist rhetoric it is notable that this is not just a 
rejection of the non-European but also the rejection of other Europeans. While it is the Arab, the 
black and the Muslim who are the consistent focus of popular racism, such features are also 
increasingly accompanied by an intensification of anti-European sentiment. This is particularly 
evident in the context of the enlargement of the European Union promoting the mobility of labour 
from the former Eastern Europe. Similarly with Bourdieu, Balibar calls for the development of a 
new European social movement that works across national boundaries such a movement would 
need to mutually address the right to difference as well as measures which sought to correct the 
global economy. However neither Bourdieu’s nor Balibar’s arguments adequately address some of 
the undoubted problems that a post-national social movement would have to address. In this context 
I want to look at some of the contemporary cultural transformations in respect of individualisation.   
 
Civil Society and Individualisation 
 
Here the argument is that European civil society is not so much being colonised as it is being 
individualised. In this respect, I want to suggest that we need to view the individualisation of 
European modernity as an ambivalent social and cultural creation. Individualisation means the 
disembedding of the ways of industrial society and the reinvention of new communal ties and 
biographies. For sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992) as more areas of social life become less defined by 
tradition the more our biographies require choice and planning. We are living in the age of DIY 
biographies. Under the conditions of welfare industrialism 'people are invited to constitute 
themselves as individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as individuals and, should they 
fail, to blame themselves' (Beck 1999). Individuals are 'condemned' to become authors of their own 
lives. The disintegration of the nuclear family and rigid class hierarchies means we are all released 
from the structures of industrial society into the uncertainties of a globalised society. Such a 
dynamic means that we often look for politics in the wrong place. In this respect, the key 
antagonism within 'reflexive' modernity lies between a politics that builds upon individualised 
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forms of reflexivity and the re-inscription of fundamentalist certitude. Such a politics asks us to 
think about widespread assumptions in respect of the colonisation of economic reason, the decline 
of values or post-modern forms of fragmentation. Modernity has given birth to both 'freedom's 
children' who have learnt that fun, mobile phones and opposition to mainstream politics can be a 
force for change, and ugly citizens and moralisers who seek to reaffirm modernity's perceived loss 
of security (Beck 1998). The main political dividing line in the struggles that mark the future will be 
between those who seek to remake civil society and community out of freedom and those who seek 
to introduce new forms of discipline and compulsion. According to Beck, it is the ethic of 
individualisation when joined with globalisation that is most likely to lead politics in a 
cosmopolitan direction. The decline of national industrialism is increasingly giving rise to a global 
cosmopolitan ethic that realises that the key problems raised by common citizenship can no longer 
be thought about and experienced in national terms (Beck 1999).  
Individualisation, as we saw above, also has potentially negative consequences. While such 
processes open the citizen to new ties and forms of attachment it also fragments older forms of 
community. For example, Richard Sennett (1998) has argued that global capital has promoted an 
uncertain culture based upon short-term contracts, insecurity, risk and superficial communal 
relations. The self fostered by neoliberalism is both open to the culture of the market, while 
fostering a pervasive sense of insecurity and a longing for community. If a citizenship based upon 
cosmopolitan forms of solidarity is to take hold it must be able to build community out of 
individualisation. If network capitalism fosters a world of atomised competitive advantage, 
citizenship needs to be able to offer the prospect of social solidarity with others who are sometimes 
different from us. Whereas uncertainty and insecurity are good for the market they are bad for 
citizenship. The development of a reactivated citizenship and cosmopolitan institutions is not only 
good for politics it is essential for democratic participation. The culture of market individualism 
rewards material success and punishes personal failure thereby requiring that we learn to balance a 
respect of difference with the rediscovery of the art of the common good (Bellah 1996). As the 
market spreads into different areas of social life citizenship arguably becomes increasingly defined 
through different kinds of social conduct. The market’s view of the citizen is through the 
individualised ability to be able to ‘maximise his or her lifestyle through acts of choice’ (Rose 2000: 
99). The market, under the guise of freedom and autonomy, acts as a mechanism regulating norms 
and instilling certain forms of behavior. In terms of the politics of welfare the aim is less the 
tackling of inequality and more ‘to help individuals themselves to provide for their social needs’ 
(Hall 2003: 18). The ambiguities of individualisation make the return of old style labour politics 
through progressive forms of unionisation highly unlikely. In this context it is the constant 
renegotiation of identity and the multiplication of the self that has become the central feature of 
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everyday life (Melucci 1996). This has created new structural inequalities between those who are 
able to work on the self and those who are denied the necessary economic and cultural resources. 
For the ‘fortunate’ the individualised society is not static but potentially overloaded with choice and 
anxiety.  Others have argued that the subject that becomes instituted through an increasing 
reflexivity in respect of the body is less the rational, free choosing citizen but the neurotic citizen 
(Isin 2004). Here citizens engage in new courses of action not only to minimise risk, but also to 
handle anxiety and fear. Neurotic citizens therefore no longer believe in the virtues of radical 
politics, but nervously engage in a number of practices to quell anxiety. The neurotic citizen is less 
concerned with new collective arrangements in the culture of living than they are in individualised 
attempts to control the body, ensure their security and privatised notions of wealth and happiness. 
Currently the neurotic citizen is much more likely to turn to either authoritarian solutions offered by 
the Right or the market for solutions to their problems than the Left. This is the terrain upon which 
the struggle for cosmopolitan solidarity must struggle. We should however resist the argument that 
we either have a world of neurotic citizens or European peoples who have learnt to stand together 
against the features that would undermine the social state. What is required are new cultural 
narratives of Europeaness that are able to compete with nationalist and largely neoliberal 
frameworks that can help citizens invest their practices and identities with meaning. A new kind of 
politics is required that is centrally concerned with the making of more convivial forms of life. Here 
following Ernst Bloc (1988) I have constructed a deliberately utopian political project that both 
anticipates a different kind of Europe to the one that currently exists and has existed in the past. As 
we shall see such a view aims to steer a middle path between a bad utopianism that simply engages 
in absolute fancy and a political realism that has become disconnected from a politics of hope. 
 
A European Post-Work Future 
 
The original aim of critical theory was to find a way of connecting the subjective experiences of 
everyday life to a future more emancipated society. However, as is well known, Habermas (1985) 
has sought to break with previous generations of critical theory as it both overstated the extent to 
which modernity had been colonised by instrumental reason and neglected the role of law and 
morality. Such has been the power of this critique that most recent writing in critical theory is more 
likely to be engaged with the scope of public reason than questions related to the culture industry, 
aesthetics or libidinous sexuality which concerned previous generations of critical theory. Here the 
triumph of the democratic argument has meant that critical theory has had more to say about the 
development of cosmopolitan forms of governance than it has on more immediate features of 
everyday life. My argument is that in the European context it urgently needs to recover such a 
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vocabulary. There is indeed the grim danger that critical theory could end up as a discourse that only 
connects with the aspirations of democratic elites. Colin Crouch (2004) has warned that European 
politics is increasingly driven by the needs of business elites rather than the engagements of 
ordinary people. Here Europeans are inching towards a post-democracy where elections become 
empty spectacles increasingly shaped by the needs of capital. In these terms the European project 
should break with a cosmopolitan identity that only involves a horizontal dialogue between political 
elites. The task for a European Left becomes the recovery of an ethical vision that potentially fosters 
a form of solidarity between cosmopolitans and locals, rather than enhancing their polarisation. 
There are of course a number of problems such a European social movement would do well to 
avoid. Firstly after the criticisms made by Foucault (1977) there is the fear of offering a substantive 
version of the good life should it become exclusive and orientated around certain ways of life rather 
than others. Here the fear is that normative critique will become normalising. Terry Eagleton (2004) 
has recently argued that such views mistakenly represent norms as being only restrictive. Here 
Habermas’s main charge against different versions of post-structuralism and post-modernism is that 
they fail to recognise the impossibility and indeed undesirability of ditching normative thinking 
altogether (Fraser 1994). In seeking to evade charges of normalisation Habermas’s radical model of 
the public sphere has sought to be agnostic in terms of the specific debates and formulations that are 
introduced for democratic discussion. These arguments are important and yet they need to formulate 
more specific concrete alternatives that link everyday concerns, normative agendas and the 
globalised structures of modern societies. 
 Here my argument is that an alternative vision of Europe should seek to build a politics that 
makes convivial social relations more rather than less likely. We have already seen how 
economically insecure and overworked Europeans are increasingly turning to nationalism and 
chauvinism in order to vent their frustrations. A more convivial Europe on the other hand would 
need to find a link between an ecologically sensitive post-materialist politics and a cultural politics 
that sought to deconstruct the imperial mentalities that continue to linger in the cultural sphere. 
Such a politics would need to address head on the manufacture of new anxieties that link the politics 
of deindustrialisation and the politics of race. In other words, the only cosmopolitan solidarity worth 
having would have to both develop a correcting logic towards the creation of economic uncertainty 
and foster a culture of solidarity with the Other. In this understanding Europe would need to engage 
with a politics beyond the nation that decisively broke with a Europe of neoliberalism or a fortress 
Europe. Such a view of Europe would need to dispense with notions of citizenship that sought to 
preserve a common civilisational cultural space (Marfleet 1999). Here Europeans would no longer 
seek to gain a common identity from market cultures of atomised competition or racial exclusion. 
Such a view of post-national citizenship would seek to develop a more convivial Europe. By this I 
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mean the development of shared and overlapping cultures that took pleasure in engaging with the 
Other. Such a shared culture would need to foster the conditions for a public culture that was more 
concerned to facilitate dialogue, mutual curiosity and communal relationships than privatised 
pleasures. This would mean simultaneously breaking with market-defined notions of the good life 
while constructing post-national solidarity through difference.  
In terms of contemporary critical theory it has been Andre Gorz (1994) who has most 
consistently argued that human flourishing is not well served by the increasing dominance of the 
market over the spheres of everyday life. In this sense, socialism needs to be redefined as ‘the 
emancipation of individuals in fields where the logic of the market, competition and profit functions 
to prevent individuals from achieving autonomy and fulfillment’ (Gorz 1994: 39). In the context of 
the failure of ‘actually existed’ Left politics within Europe the argument here is to abandon old style 
socialism and redefine it in terms of the material and cultural conditions evident within modern 
post-industrial society. The aim of socialising the means of production and enhancing the autonomy 
of skilled craft workers in the work place suggests a nostalgic rather than critical politics. Such a 
version of citizenship does not aim to develop a new social system, but to place limits on the 
capacity of economic reason to colonise the life-world. However such features would also need to 
develop in tandem with Habermas’s (1991) concerns to develop a democratic socialism appropriate 
for higher levels of social and cultural complexity. Social solidarity can only emerge through a 
legally protected democratic polity and the collective mobilisation of a diversity of public spheres. 
However, as I have indicated, such proposals are neither culturally nor materially specific enough. 
As Raymond Williams (1961) well understood, society’s capacity to be able to learn through 
democratic discussion is actually dependent upon the ability to set social and cultural limits on the 
expression of economic reason and the complex development of social and cultural institutions and 
ways of life. However as I have indicated if these principles are to gain a footing in a European and 
a global setting then we need to be clear that there is no return to the old style labour movement. 
 Gorz’s redefinition of socialism is more concerned with the expansion of autonomy than 
systems building; this means that such features connect with some of the more positive features of 
individualisation. In Gorz’s terms the key antagonism within modernity lies between issues related 
to self-realisation and autonomy as opposed to the maximization of production and consumption. 
These features neatly dovetail Beck’s (1999) argument that individualisation potentially leads to the 
enhanced questioning that more and bigger necessarily means better. As is well known, Gorz 
(1989,1991) has consistently argued over a number of publications that human liberation can only 
proceed through the re-distribution of work and the reduction of working time. Such features would 
allow more time for the development of autonomous activities outside of paid employment and the 
establishment of communicative, sporting, artistic and community building activities and spaces 
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free from the pressures of economic reason. The changes taking place in the modern labour market 
has seen the expansion of part-time work, increasing insecurity and complaints of overwork and 
stress, meaning that work can no longer be the place where citizens ‘discover’ their central identity. 
The inability of our society to consider the importance of free time means that for those in full-time 
work their lives are increasingly dominated by instrumental efficiency criteria and lack of time. 
Alternatively those excluded from the labour market often lack the material resources to make 
meaningful choices. Gorz is arguing that human solidarity and autonomy is dependent upon a life 
that has not become subordinate to the long hours and competitive individualism required by the 
modern work place, and enjoys enough free time in a context that is not starved of material 
resources to make it meaningful. 
 More recently, Gorz (1999) has argued that as citizens free themselves from the domination 
of full-time work and capital they become able to fore fill themselves through a range of other 
activities. Either work is integrated into a multi-active life or multi-activity has to become 
subordinate to the demands of work. For citizens autonomy is strengthened when they are free from 
the disciplines imposed upon them by holding down a full-time job. The multi-activity based society 
would allow the priorities of culture (different kinds of self-realisation involved in sport, education, 
voluntary work, child care) to take priority over the work-based society. These aspirations only 
become possible in a society that has both redistributed work and guaranteed a basic income for all. 
This would allow citizens to both reject poor working conditions and enhance their control over 
their lives. Here Gorz continues to argue against some of his critics that a basic income should not 
be dependent upon the duty to undertake voluntary work. The ultimate goal of diminishing the role 
of economic reason in everyday life is to enhance the role of autonomous activities free from the 
dominance of capital. Zygmunt Bauman (1999) has argued that basic income is best defended on 
republican grounds rather than the benefits it may or may not have for the poor. Here the argument 
is that a basic income institutes the principle of sharing amongst citizens rather than neoliberal 
forms of competition. The political benefit of such a policy is that it offers the possibility of the 
consumer oriented life becoming one life-style option amongst many. The main deterrent to 
republican forms of involvement can be found in the uncertainty of the labour market and the 
hegemony of consumerism over other ethical choices. Such arguments have a ‘family resemblance’ 
with many feminist arguments that seek to redefine citizenship by finding space for human qualities 
such as nurturance and care that have been excluded by a narrow masculine individualism (Werbner 
1999). Defining the public in more inclusive terms allows for a variety of human engagements 
beyond the requirements of competitive individualism. Further, the decoupling of income and work 
and enhancing the prospect of uncommodified free time also increases the possibility of creating a 
sustainable future (Sachs 2001). 
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Indeed, it is currently noticeable that similar ideas are gathering apace both inside and 
outside of mainstream political circles. There is not a week that goes by in the public sphere without 
talk about the need to achieve greater work/life balance. The Guardian newspaper journalist 
Madeline Bunting’s (2004) book on overwork is deeply critical of a British society that is currently 
maintaining an opt-out from the EU’s working time regulations. She argues for a society where 
working hours are reduced and people are better equipped to balance employment and caring. 
Indeed Gorz’s argument is that long hours and the systemic requirement for optimum performance 
increases the pressure to buy time from others. For Gorz this creates a new class of servants who are 
bought to do work the economically privileged find boring or beneath them. There is then a growing 
concern about the effects of the out-sourcing of care and the ability of citizens to balance the needs 
of the public and the private. 
What is at stake is the creation of the material conditions that would potentially enhance the 
development of post-national forms of solidarity within Europe. However whatever the desirability 
of these strategies the recent French experience and the expansion of the European Union make it 
hard to be positive about the future of such strategies (Little 2002).  Gorz is however asking some of 
the right questions in seeking to locate a politics beyond an obsessive concern with employment, the 
demonisation of the unemployed and an under-valuing of care and child rearing. According to 
Ulrich Beck (2000b) the main cultural project of our time is to find a creative balance between paid 
employment, practices of care and civic involvement. Europeans need to construct a society of 
multi-activity. This would inevitably involve a revaluing of spheres of activity like voluntary work, 
housework, parenting and friendship that fall outside of paid employment. At this point Beck 
introduces the concept of civic labour. By this he means the idea that citizens increasingly become 
moved from a world of anonymous privacy into working for the common good. While civic labour 
would not itself be formally paid it could be rewarded through civic money with the aim of creating 
spaces of experimental diversity. In other words, civic labour and civic money aim to create a 
genuinely diverse civil society strengthening initiatives that aim campaign on behalf of refugees, the 
environment, the disabled and literacy based issues. This provides an alternative social vision to a 
Europe of active employment and political passivity. Here the republican ideal of democratic 
participation rests less upon a basic income strategy, but perhaps more feasibly (at least at first) with 
civic money that could be traded in for pension entitlements, crèche facilities and educational 
establishments. There is a serious need to recreate the institutional conditions that make it possible 
for citizens to rebuild an idea of a society built upon solidarity. There are of course those who will 
argue that in a global market Europe simply cannot afford the welfare states of the past. This 
position is increasingly becoming the dominant common sense of newspaper columnists and the 
political classes. Yet such a view fails to adequately address the progressive privatization of modern 
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society and the shared capacity of citizens to nourish collective projects of social transformation 
(Castoriadis 1997). 
 
 
European Post-Imperial Identity and the Politics of Conviviality. 
 
The argument thus far is for a European Left that attempts to reduce the scope of neoliberalism and 
the promotion of a culture of scepticism in respect of the benefits of consumerism, long hours and 
the outsourcing of care. This would arguably provide an alternative social and cultural imaginary to 
the competitive individualism required by neoliberalism. Such a post-materialist politics would also 
need to break with a Eurocentric imagination built upon the superiority of European values. This 
would require an enhanced questioning of ideas of a singular European heritage or paths to 
development that were necessarily suitable for other global societies. A reconstructed Europeanism 
would break with both the deformations of nationalism (which hide the ways in which we are 
culturally mixed in with one another) and the idea that capitalism offers a singular global path for 
development (Amin 1989). Much postcolonial thinking has sought to emphasise the need to 
decolonise Western/European imaginations in the light of the histories of European colonialism and 
continued patterns of dominance. In this respect, postcoloniality has sought to emphasise diasporic 
identity, inter-cultural dialogue and reflexivity as opposed to the language of civilisations and 
cultural nationalism (Pieterse and Parekh 1995). Rather than European self-congratulation, the ethos 
of a post-colonial Europe has been to discover that European ‘civilisation’ has largely consisted of a 
hybridity of cultural associations (Pieterse 1994). These are important theoretical and cultural 
developments and are increasingly necessary in the face of racist nationalisms, which seek to defend 
‘our’ common heritage or home against others (immigrants, asylum seekers, migrant workers).  
Here Europeans are represented as seeking to defend their social achievements against the 
greed and demands of ‘outsiders’. In this respect, European citizenship has become increasingly 
complex as boundaries become at once both more porous and more policed (Benhabib 2002). 
Despite arguments for a post-national citizenship on the part of cosmopolitan intellectuals it seems 
that nationalism and the state can still claim an imaginary power that enforces an institutional 
racism through the rejection of the Other. Here nationality becomes the very essence of citizenship 
that needs to defended against those foreigners who would seek its corruption. Notably the appeal to 
sameness continues to provide for many people an immediate antidote to anxiety that is created by 
economic and political uncertainty. The kind of progressive European solidarity that is being 
articulated here will be hard to create in a world where ‘the nation’ becomes an anchor in the 
troubled waters of globalisation. In this context, Paul Gilroy (2002) has argued that the idea of 
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diaspora offers an alternative cultural logic to nationalism in its ability to be able to disrupt the links 
between cultural identity and place. The Europe of diasporic communities and inter-cultural 
communication offers the possibility of a cosmopolitan politics and culture from below. However 
such postcolonial visions will have to learn to interrupt everyday nationalism and the languages of 
civilisations that is still part of the dominant culture. Etienne Balibar (2004) has argued that the 
closure of national citizenship and the exclusion of foreigners recall the colonial heritage of 
European societies. The recolonisation of immigration involves an administrative apparatus that 
aims to scrutinise populations from the less civilised South, illegal migrant workers with few formal 
citizenship rights and the development of new citizenship ceremonies aiming to ‘civilise’ new 
arrivals. Whereas The Maastricht treaty of 1992 allowed for the free settlement of European 
immigrants, others from non-EU countries are increasingly exposed to exclusion. This is 
particularly evident if we consider the large number of undocumented domestic workers from Third 
World countries (Lutz 1997). The hiring of domestic workers bearing an obvious relationship to the 
outsourcing of care and domestic labour required by increasingly overworked Europeans mentioned 
earlier. 
Here my question is whether a more convivial European identity is actually possible? Could 
Europeaness become detached from neoliberalism, nationalism and the maintenance of male 
dominance and exclusive whiteness? Indeed if Europeaness is currently valued by many 
cosmopolitan liberals and socialists for providing a politics beyond the nation they have failed thus 
far to reinvent the term as a form of cultural politics that has a new relationship with cultural 
difference and the Other. Without such a cultural politics it is indeed hard to see how the post-
material arguments of the previous section would not end up either enforcing European exclusivity 
or European superiority. The reinvention of Europeaness does not so much depend upon both 
pluralism and difference, but also the creation of new, less exclusive cultural identities that have 
learnt to act in the public without retreating into neurotic privatism. If a European post-work future 
offers one model of conviviality a postcolonial Europe offers another. The idea of a Europe that has 
rejected neoliberalism offers the prospect of citizens who have broken with market - defined 
definitions of the good life and have learnt to experiment with alternative pleasures as well as a 
renewed focus upon participatory citizenship. Such a vision of Europeaness needs to be coupled 
with a post-imperial cultural politics that welcomes difference. Europeaness is not so much a 
discoverable essence, but is more an ethos that seeks to enhance both different human qualities 
(beyond a hyper-competitive market orientated masculinity) and welcomes cultural difference 
(subverting the imposition of cultural nationalism). Such features will inevitably involve a cultural 
politics of translation. My argument is that in opposition to a Europe of bureaucrats and political 
elites, we cannot simply reverse this image and reinvest in a worker’s Europe in the manner of 
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Pierre Bourdieu (2001, 2003). A hybrid and post-materialist Europe could only emerge out of 
political and cultural struggles that denied the essentialist logic of pre-given fault lines. Instead a 
Europe of cultural difference would seek to displace older notions of superiority or simple pluralism 
(or indeed the preservation of national purity) with an international culture based upon the 
principles of negotiation and translation. Europeaness in this reading becomes the possibility of 
articulating a culture based not on the languages of lost civilisations, but upon ‘culture-as-political-
struggle’ (Bhabha 1994: 35). If the idea of Europe has from the beginning been characterised by 
social and cultural struggles there is no reason why it cannot take on new oppositional meanings to 
articulate the citizenship needs of the post-national present (Delanty 1995). 
 
European Futures  
 
The capacity to construct an alternative European post-national citizenship is an important 
contemporary political and cultural struggle. The danger is of course that Europeans will become so 
caught up in their own unique identity that it becomes separate from more global struggles. 
However the current economic and military dominance of the United States, the imperatives of 
neoliberalism and the rivals of nationalism and racism all require the discovery of new European 
political and cultural logics. The politics of such a position shifts the cultural logic of such processes 
to questions of becoming rather than being European. Indeed I would have to recognise along with 
Ash Amin (2004: 17) that Europeans are currently ‘in no mood to replicate the kinds of cultural 
experiment launched by the New Left and the student movement in 1968’. However with the current 
stalling of the European constitution there is at least an opportunity for us to ask not only what kind 
of Europe we want but also the kind of Europeans we wish to become. Such a political and cultural 
dialogue would need to articulate a cosmopolitanism from below that was not only concerned about 
the fate of fellow or potential Europeans. Despite many who have argued that a more modest 
Europeanism should disconnect from other parts of the world the logic of global polarisation, war 
and conflict does not make this a possibility. Despite the fears that Europeanisation actually means 
cultural homogenisation and environmental destruction I have sought to articulate a different 
cultural and political logic. Arguably rapidly increasing global poverty and the threat of global 
warming make the formation of new European political and cultural identities more and not less 
pressing (Pieterse 2002). If the Europeanism of the past has been closely associated with the twin 
forces of capitalism and nationalism now seems as good a time as any to imagine new more 
convivial possibilities. 
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